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THE OFFICER CORPS,
PROFESS IONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY
IN THE RUSS IAN REVOLUTION*
MATTHEW RENDLE
Aberystwyth University
A B S T R ACT. Russia’s ‘democratic ’ revolution of February 1917 saw all types of professions and social
groups mobilize into unions and congresses to articulate their demands. Lower and middle classes dominated,
but it is notable how former elite groups were quick to form bodies to defend their interests and to promote
their visions of Russia’s future. Historians have invariably dismissed these groups as marginal to the
revolutionary process and inherently ‘ counter-revolutionary ’. This article challenges these assumptions, using
the Union of Oﬃcers, formed across the military in May 1917 to defend oﬃcers’ professional interests, as
a case study. The union spread quickly, published a newspaper, and agitated among politicians for
greater discipline in the military. Its activities fuelled popular fears of counter-revolution, but only a few of
the union’s leaders actively worked against the government. General Kornilov’s failed revolt in August
demonstrated that most oﬃcers had doubts. Nevertheless, the union played a crucial role in mobilizing
moderate and conservative forces against further reform. This exacerbated social conﬂict and political
polarization, fatally undermining the Provisional Government and democracy in 1917.
I
There were numerous visions of democracy in Russia during 1917 ranging from
the rule of law, civil rights, and parliament envisaged by educated liberals, to the
popular belief of lower classes that democracy meant political power for ordinary
Russians. Indeed, the ‘democratic revolution’ of February was often more about
the unions, committees, and congresses that emerged to represent all types of
professions and social groups than the recognizable political parties that claimed
to speak in their name. The new Provisional Government had to consider many
of these groups’ demands in attempting to achieve its aims of civil liberties, law,
and order, and elections to a Constituent Assembly. Similarly, as nationwide
elections were delayed, the few national ‘democratic ’ bodies in 1917 – the
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Moscow State Conference, the Democratic Conference, and the Pre-
Parliament – were formed after detailed bargaining with all groups.1
It is particularly notable that the formation of unions and other organizations
was not restricted to the lower and middle classes. Former elite groups – nobles,
landowners, oﬃcers, industrialists, and others – were also quick to mobilize. They
were keen to represent their own interests in the new political climate and to
promote their own vision of Russia’s future. They were encouraged by the
government’s awareness that it needed the support of all political and social
forces, whilst the government’s objectives were broadly acceptable. The lack of
real ‘democracy’ ensured that they were represented in ‘democratic ’ bodies, but
what did they hope to achieve given their small support base, the anti-bourgeois
mood, and mass support for socialist parties and social reform? The revolution
was increasingly characterized by political polarization and social conﬂict,
whilst popular fears of counter-revolution escalated. Were these bodies ‘counter-
revolutionary’ and how far did their organizations contribute to the conﬂict
that came to dominate 1917 and signalled the failure of the Provisional Govern-
ment?
This article examines these issues through a study of the Union of Oﬃcers,
analysing its objectives, activities, and impact. Oﬃcers were an important group
during this period. The absence of support among senior oﬃcers for Tsar
Nicholas II in February 1917 had facilitated his sudden abdication and they
continued to play a vital role in the war eﬀort. The potential military power that
oﬃcers could muster also contributed to fears of counter-revolution. The union
was formally created in May to defend the professional interests of oﬃcers.
It promoted its programme across the military through newspapers, pamphlets,
and agitation. The union enthusiastically supported General L. G. Kornilov
(commander-in-chief from mid-July) and his strong policies for the military.
Its leaders participated in his revolt against the Provisional Government in
August, but it failed, and members were harassed and arrested. Its everyday
activities have not been discussed beyond this brief outline ; there have been
no detailed studies and broader accounts invariably emphasize the union’s
‘counter-revolutionary’ activities and minority status. Wildman doubted whether
the union ‘either inﬂuenced or represented the sentiments of the vast majority of
oﬃcers ’. Instead, he believed that it mobilized ‘a network of staﬀ oﬃcers of a
certain type that fed into the Kornilov movement ’.2 Soviet historians were more
1 See D. Orlovsky, ‘Corporatism or democracy: the Russian Provisional Government of 1917’, in
A. Weiner, ed., Landscaping the human garden: twentieth century population management in a comparative framework
(Stanford, CA, 2003), pp. 67–90; D. Orlovskii, ‘K voprosu o formakh demokratii nakanune oktiabria
1917 goda’, in L. Zakharova et al., eds., P. A. Zaionchkovskii, 1904–1983 gg. : stat’i, publikatsii i vospominaniia o
nem (Moscow, 1998), pp. 407–29.
2 A. Wildman, ‘Oﬃcers of the General Staﬀ and the Kornilov movement’, in E. Frankel et al., eds.,
Revolution in Russia : reassessments of 1917 (Cambridge, 1992), p. 94. Also G. Katkov, Russia, 1917, the Kornilov
revolt (London, 1980) ; J. Munck, The Kornilov revolt (Aarhus, 1987).
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damning, dismissing it as inherently ‘counter-revolutionary’ along with other
bodies representing conservative and elite groups.3
The extent to which oﬃcers can be described as an elite group is questionable
as they were suﬃciently heterogeneous to make generalizations diﬃcult. There
were around 145,000 oﬃcers serving in the military on the eve of the revolution.
This was a threefold increase from the beginning of the war in 1914. Only about
51 per cent were from the nobility (the traditional source of oﬃcers), falling to
40 per cent in the infantry. Equally, only 5.5 per cent of the graduates of new
oﬃcer schools established to replace the heavy casualties suﬀered by oﬃcers were
nobles. The majority of generals (87 per cent) and colonels (63 per cent) did
remain nobles, but it is clear that most oﬃcers lacked social status or material
well-being.4 This diversity was displayed in the range of political beliefs and
allegiances shown by oﬃcers during the revolution.
If elites are deﬁned in terms of power, however, all oﬃcers enjoyed legal rights
and privileges that clearly distinguished them from soldiers and sailors. The
pressures of the war meant that there was now no such thing as a lower-ranked,
non-noble oﬃcer with few prospects ; new recruits were promoted rapidly to
ﬁll the ever-present gaps in the oﬃcer corps. Some adopted the mentality and
outlook traditionally assigned to oﬃcers ; they were suspicious of politics, saw
themselves as distinctly superior to their men, and used terms such as honour and
duty before the motherland to govern their behaviour.5 More importantly, social
and political discourse in 1917 rarely made distinctions within the oﬃcer corps.
Oﬃcers were an elite group and potential threat, irrespective of their back-
grounds, views, or political aﬃliations.
Supporters of the Union of Oﬃcers were convinced that not only did oﬃcers
require a new organization to represent their professional interests, but that such
a body could inﬂuence the military leadership and the government. Yet its desire
to unite and mobilize oﬃcers revealed divisions that were not purely based on
social background or length of service. It was diﬃcult mobilizing oﬃcers who were
dispersed across the front and who feared repercussions from militant soldiers.
Some politicized oﬃcers had formed earlier organizations, whilst others saw
the union as a means of conspiring against the government. Most wanted to
restore order in the military and the country, but opposed plans to overthrow
the government. So while the union’s leadership represented some of the most
authoritarian thinking in 1917, it is misleading to view the union as inherently
‘counter-revolutionary’. It marginalizes its everyday activities supporting oﬃcers
and ignores the fact that the reckless actions of its leaders alienated many mem-
bers.
3 See G. Ioﬀe, Krakh Rossiiskoi monarkhicheskoi kontrrevoliutsii (Moscow, 1977) ; M. Kapustin, Zagovor
generalov (iz istorii Kornilovshchiny i ee razgroma) (Moscow, 1968) ; N. Ivanov, Kontrrevoliutsiia v Rossii v 1917
godu i ee razgrom (Moscow, 1977) ; V. Vladimirova, Kontr-revoliutsiia v 1917g. (Kornilovshchina) (Moscow,
1924).
4 A. Wildman, The end of the Russian imperial army (2 vols., Princeton, 1980–7), I, pp. 22–3, 100–1.
5 See S. Volkov, Russkii oﬁtserskii korpus (Moscow, 1993).
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All elite organizations faced the same issues : the determination to mobilize into
unions to combat bodies formed by other social groups and professions ; the belief
that they could inﬂuence the government ; divisions over the best means to exert
inﬂuence ; growing discontent with the social unrest and the new political system;
and indecision over plans for a counter-revolution.6 Nonetheless, the mobilization
of these groups exacerbated political conﬂict as 1917 progressed. Popular opinion
was formed by the people’s own demands and their reactions to policies, but it
was inﬂuenced by the demands and activities of their political opponents. By
summer 1917, conservative elites had re-emerged nationally. They lacked popular
support, but their experience, wealth, and position made them threatening
opponents, whilst their expanding organizations provided a visible sign of this
threat.7 The growing prominence of oﬃcers, in particular, fuelled fears of coun-
ter-revolution across Russia, yet the government was reliant on oﬃcers to main-
tain its own position and ﬁght the war, and the inﬂuence of oﬃcers grew in 1917 as
both of these became more problematic. This dynamic was crucial to the lack of
political consensus during the Russian Revolution, and the ultimate failure of the
Provisional Government and democracy.
I I
The idea for a union of oﬃcers originated among a small group of staﬀ oﬃcers
based at the military headquarters (Stavka) in Mogilev. They were deeply con-
cerned about the deteriorating situation within the military. On 1 March, Order
No. 1 provided soldiers with new rights, whilst the proliferation of soldiers’ com-
mittees had further undermined the authority of oﬃcers. There were already
organizations claiming to represent oﬃcers that enjoyed a degree of inﬂuence.
Socialist oﬃcers, usually from the junior ranks, had rallied to the Soviet of
Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies in late February to mobilize forces against any
attempt to suppress the revolution. A few days later, they established the Union of
Oﬃcer-Republicans to promote a democratic republic across the military.8 Most
oﬃcers, however, viewed socialism with intense suspicion and greater numbers,
including senior oﬃcers, were involved in the Soviet of Oﬃcers’ Deputies, which
elected an executive committee on 11 March. This did include socialists, but
openly supported the new government.9 Both groups published newspapers, but
6 On industrialists and landowners, Z. Galili, ‘Commercial-industrial circles in revolution: the
failure of ‘‘ industrial progressivism’’ ’, in Frankel et al., eds., Revolution in Russia, pp. 188–216;
M. Rendle, ‘Conservatism and revolution: the All-Russian Union of Landowners, 1916–1918’, Slavonic
and East European Review, 84 (2006), pp. 481–507.
7 On images of counter-revolution in 1917, D. Shlapentokh, The counter-revolution in revolution
(London, 1999).
8 Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi federatsii (GARF), f. 4018 [Soiuz oﬁtserov-respublikantsev
narodnoi armii. 1917], op. 1, d. 2, ll. 5–6; A. Tarasov-Rodionov, February 1917 (Westport, CT, 1973),
pp. 214–19. 9 Rech’, no. 62, 14 Mar. 1917.
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only the former established branches across the military. The soviet remained
deliberately broad, claiming to represent the whole oﬃcer corps.
The staﬀ oﬃcers in Stavka did not believe, however, that the Soviet of Oﬃcers’
Deputies did represent the views of the majority of oﬃcers, seeing it as a political
body dominated by oﬃcers based in the rear. These oﬃcers did not understand
the pressures at the front and were involved in plans for future reform that, in the
opinion of the Stavka oﬃcers, would further harm oﬃcers. On 12 April, the soviet
publicized plans for a conference in Petrograd during May. This prompted the
oﬃcers at Stavka, led by Lieutenant-Colonels D. A. Lebedev and V. M. Pronin,
to circulate proposals a few days later for a rival congress in Stavka.10 They
intended to use the gathering to form a new professional union for oﬃcers and
established a nine-man committee to organize the conference. It pledged full
support for the Provisional Government as the sole legal authority, but stressed
the need for strict discipline to maintain the ﬁghting capability of the military.
It also warned oﬃcers – in a clear jibe towards the Soviet of Oﬃcers – to avoid
politics and urged them instead to join a professional oﬃcers’ union. The new
union would establish branches across the military, issue publications, and
mobilize oﬃcers across the front to defend their interests. It would not engage in
party politics, but concentrate on the everyday concerns of oﬃcers and represent
them to the government. Although the union had not been formally created, the
organizing committee acted as if it had. It issued appeals in the name of the
union, urged existing supporters to agitate, and called for new members.11
Oﬃcers had mixed reactions. A few weeks earlier, staﬀ oﬃcers on the
Romanian front had argued that a new union would simply expose political
diﬀerences among the oﬃcers and antagonize the soldiers. A conference would
be suﬃcient to discuss pertinent military and political issues.12 Others disagreed.
Lieutenant-Colonel L. N. Novosil’tsev, for example, was a liberal (Kadet)
member of the fourth Duma. He had helped to establish the authority of
the Provisional Government in Kaluga, but was quickly disillusioned by the
radicalism of junior oﬃcers and the proliferation of soldiers’ committees. He
feared that the oﬃcer corps would disintegrate across party lines and felt that
oﬃcers in Petrograd were ‘careerists ’ pandering to the revolution (a view shared
by others). He welcomed the proposals from Stavka and was elected to represent
his division.13 The high command’s initial concerns also faded amid fears that
the views of most oﬃcers were being misrepresented. It was unjust to forbid
oﬃcers to unite when the forthcoming declaration of soldiers’ rights would permit
organizations in the military.14
10 Rech’, no. 84, 12 Apr. 1917; no. 89, 17 Apr. 1917.
11 Rech’, no. 90, 18 Apr. 1917; no. 95, 25 Apr. 1917; no. 103, 4 May 1917.
12 Vestnik Rumynskogo fronta, no. 1, 3 Apr. 1917, reprinted in A. Panov, ed., Armiia i politika : oﬁtserskii
korpus v politicheskoi istorii Rossii. Dokumenty i materialy (7 vols., Moscow and Kaluga, 2002–3), II, pp. 81–2.
13 GARF, f. 6422 [L. N. Novosil’tsev], op. 1, d. 1, ll. 125ob, 135ob–137.
14 A. Denikin, The Russian Turmoil (Westport, CT, 1973), pp. 229–30.
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Questions about the proposed union’s purpose resurfaced during a preliminary
meeting held on 5 May, prior to the formal opening of the All-Russian Congress
of the Union of Oﬃcers of the Army and the Fleet in Stavka on 7 May 1917. One
delegate asked why there were two simultaneous congresses of oﬃcers (Petrograd
and Stavka), arguing that everyone should transfer to Petrograd to achieve the
complete unity of all front and rear oﬃcers. Others, though, were sceptical that
issues could be discussed objectively in the politicized atmosphere of Petrograd.
Non-military, political bodies were dominant in the capital and political topics
took precedence. In contrast, Stavka’s location at the centre of the war eﬀort
meant that the oﬃcers involved had the knowledge and experience to discuss
the questions of immediate importance for maintaining the ﬁghting capabilities of
the military.15
Another delegate questioned whether, as in Petrograd, soldiers should be
represented and, if so, whether they should have a right to vote on issues
discussed. The congress’s organizing committee had intended to allow soldiers to
attend, but only as observers. One delegate exploded: ‘why is it that whenever
oﬃcers speak or gather, the question always arises – and what about the
soldiers? ’ For him, the whole point of the congress was that it was for oﬃcers.
Others agreed, apparently shouting that it was shameful that all social groups
could unite apart from oﬃcers. Oﬃcers had spilt three years’ worth of blood, but
could not say what they felt. Lebedev lost control of the meeting as chair and was
replaced by Novosil’tsev (due to his greater political experience). In the end, 53
per cent of those present voted to allow soldiers a vote but, after all that, the
soldiers refused; they wanted to observe, but did not want to be associated
with any resolutions.16 The revolution had forced oﬃcers to accept the soldiers’
presence, but it was the conviction that oﬃcers should express their views in-
dependently of outside interference, and that a new union could best achieve this
goal, that dominated the subsequent congress.
Sources suggest that 298 oﬃcers attended the main congress, which lasted from
7 to 22 May. Roughly 80 per cent were from the front and 20 per cent from the
rear (mostly from active regiments), whilst more appeared during the congress.17
Sessions covered the current situation in the military ; factors aﬀecting the
war eﬀort ; the relationship between oﬃcers and soldiers ; discipline; the authority
of oﬃcers ; and the general position of oﬃcers.18 The outlook was negative.
General M. V. Alekseev, the commander-in-chief, and his chief of staﬀ, General
A. I. Denikin, gave opening speeches painting a pessimistic picture of Russia’s
situation, despairing at the lack of patriotism among the soldiers. The congress’s
solutions were predictable : restore the chain of command and the authority of
15 GARF, f. 4018, op. 1, d. 4, ll. 1ob–2. 16 GARF, f. 4018, op. 1, d. 4, ll. 1–1ob.
17 Vestnik glavnago komiteta soiuza oﬁtserov armii i ﬂota (VGKO), no. 1, 14 June 1917.
18 GARF, f. 1780 [Chrezvychainaia komissiia dlia rassledovaniia dela o byvshem verkhovnom
glavno-komanduiushchem generale L. G. Kornilove i ego souchastnikakh], op. 1, d. 71, ll. 49–53ob
(a summary of events).
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oﬃcers ; re-establish the means to enforce orders ; remove soldiers’ committees
from operational matters ; and place emphasis on soldiers’ duties. ‘Thoughtless ’
and ‘unscrupulous ’ oﬃcers exacerbated the situation (through participation in
politics as much as anything else) and there needed to be educational work among
oﬃcers, alongside oﬃcers’ courts to enforce duty. The congress agreed that all
orders relating to the military must come from the government, but most fa-
voured stronger state policies on all of the above issues.
Novosil’tsev saw his job as chair to ensure that the congress was productive. He
was afraid that socialists would force it to shut and worked quickly to draw up
programmes, establish committees, and vote on resolutions. He was convinced
that only creating a permanent union would prevent the congress’s opinions from
being quickly forgotten. This determination was essential as many continued to
prevaricate over the need for a union purely for oﬃcers. There were alternative
proposals for a general military union of oﬃcers and soldiers that had the support
of the soldiers and the minister of war, A. F. Kerenskii. Novosil’tsev and others
felt that this would simply be another body marginalizing oﬃcers and pushed
through the new union. They formed a bloc to lobby delegates and forge a
majority for the union’s supporters.19 The congress duly ratiﬁed the regulations of
the Union of Oﬃcers of the Army and Fleet on 21 May. A main committee was
elected with Novosil’tsev as president, Pronin and Lieutenant-Colonel V. I.
Sidorin as his deputies, and Captain V. E. Rozhenko as secretary.20 Alekseev and
Denikin were honorary president and member respectively, thereby cementing
links with the high command. The union was committed to carrying out
government orders and reforms, but its leaders passionately believed that oﬃcers
had the right to express their views.
By establishing a permanent union, these oﬃcers placed themselves in a better
position than their counterparts in Petrograd (who were also divided, but voted
against creating a formal union) to mobilize oﬃcers, and to beneﬁt from their
growing discontent at the deteriorating situation. Nevertheless, politics remained
in the background. Novosil’tsev argued, to deep applause, that ‘political questions
are questions of secondary importance. The vital question is about the life of
Russia and all of our attention and strength will be devoted to this. ’ Yet, another
speaker noted that ‘military and professional questions were deeply entwined
with political ones ’. Oﬃcers needed ‘ to establish what kind of government and
what kind of voice will lead the country. Then we need to direct our activities
towards helping it. ’21 This also received warm applause and demonstrated
the inherent problem facing these oﬃcers ; in defending their professional inter-
ests, they inevitably highlighted, especially as the revolution developed, their
preferred political system. In arguing for stronger measures to restore order and
authority in the military, delegates appeared to be supporting a stronger, more
19 GARF, f. 6422, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 144–7.
20 GARF, f. 1780, op. 1, d. 71, ll. 40–6 (the regulations). 21 GARF, f. 4018, op. 1, d. 4, l. 2.
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authoritarian government in Russia. There was no such thing as a purely
professional union in 1917.
I I I
The union’s activities revolved around providing support and information, whilst
articulating various demands designed to improve the authority and position of
oﬃcers. It discussed reform proposals and technical issues ; it assisted in cultural
and educational work amongst oﬃcers ; and it provided practical support, in-
cluding legal aid, for its members. It established a newspaper, Vestnik glavnago
komiteta soiuza oﬁtserov armii i ﬂota, which published ﬁve issues between 14 June and
24 August.22 This was the main vehicle publicizing the union’s activities, supple-
mented by brochures and appeals. Issues included copies of letters that the main
committee sent to various authorities protesting at the mistreatment of oﬃcers,
alongside articles on policies. The union produced reports on key issues such as
soldiers’ committees and the condition of the military. By late August, the union
had improved the educational resources available for oﬃcers. Libraries were or-
ganized in several railway stations just behind the front line, as convenient
transport hubs. An agreement was reached with young teachers in Moscow to
supply suitable literature on practical issues (war and the land), as well as state
structures, history, workers, co-operatives, and foreign aﬀairs. This material was
distributed free of charge.23
The union was convinced that a lack of understanding contributed to what it
saw as the ‘politicization’ of oﬃcers and it tried to target oﬃcers who actively
supported revolutionary change, arguing that they were not capable of leading
the military. Initially, the union promoted ‘comrade courts ’ – courts controlled
and staﬀed by oﬃcers – to cleanse and control oﬃcers.24 However, these courts
could not enforce their rulings and the union resorted to blacklists, distributed
across the military and published in the Vestnik. These never contained more than
a few names (for urging peace or spreading socialist propaganda) and provoked as
much opposition as support amongst oﬃcers.25
Otherwise, the union concentrated on agitating for reforms that would restore
discipline, revive the authority of oﬃcers, and reduce the inﬂuence of soldiers’
committees. These goals received a boost after Russia launched an ill-fated of-
fensive on 18 June.26 The union suspected that only a few troops would ﬁght and
its fears were realised. The majority of oﬃcers viewed this disaster as a national
humiliation and support grew for the union’s increasingly strident demands ; in
particular, the restoration of the death penalty and the return of disciplinary
22 Copies are in GARF, f. 1780, op. 1, d. 71.
23 VGKO, no. 5, 24 Aug. 1917; GARF, f. 1780, op. 1, d. 72, l. 100.
24 VGKO, no. 2, 22 June 1917; GARF, f. 1780, op. 1, d. 71, l. 36.
25 For blacklists ; VGKO, no. 4, 25 July 1917; GARF, f. 1780, op. 1, d. 71, l. 58; d. 72, l. 45. For
contrasting views of their value; d. 72, l. 102; d. 97, ll. 126–127ob.
26 R. Wade, The Russian Revolution, 1917 (2nd edn, Cambridge, 2005), pp. 175–83.
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authority to commanders, unrestricted by ‘ irresponsible collective organs ’.27 The
union’s new mood was visible in the pages of its newspaper. Initially, the paper
was preoccupied with the need to promote the union, whilst the second and third
issues were defensive, stressing its popularity, clarifying the term ‘professional ’,
and supporting the oﬀensive. In the aftermath of the failed oﬀensive, the fourth
issue saw defence turn to attack, with uncompromising articles condemning
critics. The ﬁnal issue, on the eve of the Kornilov revolt, emphasized the strength
of the union and outlined measures that the government had to implement to
save Russia.
By mid-July, the government appeared to be listening to oﬃcers. The death
penalty was reintroduced on 12 July. Bolsheviks newspapers were prohibited on
15 July. The government took control of the network of military commissars
previously controlled by the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies on the
same day, and started to prosecute all military crimes (especially not fulﬁlling
duties or orders), imprisoning oﬀenders. Some armies established investigative
commissions that prosecuted thousands of oﬀenders.28 Oﬃcers reasserted their
authority and the inﬂuence of committees temporarily waned. The union took
some of the credit,29 but the real position is questionable. Soviet historians linked
the union’s demands with changes in government policy throughout this period,
primarily to support their view of the union as a counter-revolutionary body,
rather than an objective assessment of the union’s inﬂuence.30 It had inﬂuence at
the highest levels of the military. All three commanders-in-chief prior to August
(Alekseev, General A. A. Brusilov, and Kornilov) were honorary chairs and their
chiefs of staﬀ were honorary members (Denikin and General A. S. Lukomskii).
Stavka provided the headquarters for the union and essential printing facilities for
the Vestnik and other propaganda. The union gained a veneer of oﬃcialdom and
was seen as a mouthpiece of the high command, especially under Kornilov. On 5
August, Cornet P. A. Kravchenko (a committee member) boasted that the union
had very good relations with Stavka that enabled a ‘wide range’ of possibilities to
punish an oﬀending oﬃcer.31 Yet, the government’s own concerns undoubtedly
played a greater role, particularly since Kerenskii, minister-president from 8 July,
did not believe in a union for oﬃcers. He favoured a broad military union and saw
the union as a reactive body. By August, the government was trying (unsuccess-
fully) to remove it from Stavka.32
27 GARF, f. 1780, op. 1, d. 72, l. 78 ; Novoe vremia, no. 14833, 22 July 1917, reprinted in R. Browder
and A. Kerensky, eds., The Russian Provisional Government, 1917 : Documents (3 vols., Stanford, CA, 1961)
(RPG), III, pp. 1016–17.
28 One commission sentenced 37 oﬃcers and 12,725 soldiers by the end of Aug. ; Revoliutsionnoe
dvizhenie v Russkoi armii (27 fevralia–24 oktiabria 1917 goda) (Moscow, 1968), pp. 376–7.
29 GARF, f. 1780, op. 1, d. 72, ll. 89–89ob.
30 A. Andreev, Soldatskie massy garnizonov Russkoi armii v oktiabr’skoi revoliutsii (Moscow, 1975), p. 154.
31 GARF, f. 1780, op. 1, d. 72, ll. 88–88ob.
32 GARF, f. 6422, op. 1, d. 1, l. 152ob; Delo generala L. G. Kornilova (2 vols., Moscow, 2003), II,
pp. 346–7.
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I V
Furthermore, although the union gathered more support after the failed oﬀens-
ive, the extent to which this increased membership is unclear, as is the actual size
of the union, as there are no membership lists. It was probably considered too
dangerous to keep records, a feeling that was justiﬁed after the Bolsheviks seized
power in October. The Vestnik was quick to proclaim success. Apparently, 15,000
copies of the ﬁrst issue were distributed, alongside 8,000 copies of the union’s
regulations, and these were insuﬃcient. The union proposed to produce 50,000
copies of the second edition of its regulations and a daily newspaper. The news-
paper never appeared, but the regulations reached a third edition on 15 July.
Financial contributions came from individuals, regiments, and organizations,
ranging from a few rubles to more than 16,000.33 Branches of the union were
established in all of the armies and in the rear at Petrograd, Moscow, Kiev,
Kazan’, Odessa, Saratov, Sevastopol, and elsewhere, apparently encompassing
tens of thousands of members, including senior oﬃcers.34 It also gained support
from ad hoc ‘societies ’ of oﬃcers that had emerged locally after February. As one
declared, they sympathized with the union’s objectives and welcomed the chance
to become part of a broader (and hopefully more inﬂuential) body. In at least one
case, a society transferred intact to become a cell of the union.35
Numbers of copies do not equate to numbers of members, but the union
attracted sizeable interest from an increasingly disillusioned oﬃcer corps. The
claim that each Vestnik attracted a ﬂurry of inquiries and a signiﬁcant increase in
members seems reasonable, explaining why all associations and unions strove to
publicize their views as widely as possible.36 Indeed, local branches produced
their own ‘bulletins ’, hoping to replicate this eﬀect.37 The main committee, on at
least one occasion, agreed to loan 1,000 rubles – a sizeable sum – speciﬁcally to
enable a branch to establish a newspaper.38 By 9 July, the union had to advertise
for a scribe and a typist (without ‘harmful political views ’) to deal with the
administrative workload. It was promised that the commander-in-chief would
transfer the successful candidate to Stavka, demonstrating the union’s inﬂuence.39
Letters indicate sizeable support for a professional union that would protect
oﬃcers, promote their interests, and help those arrested by the soldiers.
Other indicators suggest that the union was slower to develop than it wished
to portray. The main committee initially seemed to assume that oﬃcers
would simply organize themselves in support. It envisaged oﬃcers forming cells in
regiments and companies. When enough of these existed, representatives from
them would form sub-branches in divisions, staﬀs, and garrisons. These would
then feed into local branches at army or regional level. By early July, however,
33 VGKO, no. 2, 22 June 1917 (statistics) ; GARF, f. 1780, op. 1, d. 71, ll. 61–76 (the 3rd edn).
34 GARF, f. 1780, op. 1, d. 71, l. 60.
35 GARF, f. 1780, op. 1, d. 72, ll. 83–4, 96, 113–113ob. 36 VGKO, no. 5, 24 Aug. 1917.
37 For example, the branch in the Tenth Army: GARF, f. 1780, op. 1, d. 72, ll. 44–49ob.
38 GARF, f. 1780, op. 1, d. 73, l. 18. 39 GARF, f. 1780, op. 1, d. 72, ll. 36–36ob.
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supporters were allowed to create sub-branches without having formed cells, as
long as they had sixteen members. By late August, the union was stressing that
only three to ﬁve people, a group of friends in eﬀect, were suﬃcient to create a cell
and join an existing branch.40 These are technical details, but they prompted
ﬁerce debates and suggest that the union struggled to recruit members at the
lowest levels in the military, where oﬃcers were concerned with maintaining good
relations with soldiers. Reports from local areas are also mixed. The union in the
Third Army had over 500 members in mid-July, but reports from the Black Sea
and the Caucasus described problems in organizing branches.41 These concerns
led to greater central organization within the union by mid-July with member-
ship, judicial, and cultural and educational committees formed, a move that
comparable bodies made much earlier.42
The union also faced cases of resistance from senior oﬃcers. The May congress
had not involved large sections of the military. In some cases, adverts about the
congress and the new union did not get through due to the war. Elsewhere,
though, commanders had decided that such measures were pointless or harmful
and had prevented oﬃcers under their command from attending. General
Grigor’ev, commander of Omsk military region, conﬁscated literature about the
union and prohibited attendance. Seventeen oﬃcers complained and the union
protested to the ministry of war (which was supportive) stressing oﬃcers’ rights as
citizens. Later issues of Vestnik contained substantial attacks on Grigor’ev, but he
was not alone; General Tsiurikov prohibited all oﬃcer organizations in the Sixth
Army to avoid conﬂict. These actions worried the union and it threatened legal
action.43 Elsewhere, hierarchical practices were needed to overcome opposition.
On 7 June, an assembly of oﬃcers in the First Caucasian Riﬂe Regiment voted on
whether to join. A third of the votes were against, but they were forced to join as
the majority then voted to prohibit oﬃcers from remaining in the regiment if they
were not members.44
It is impossible to draw ﬁrm conclusions about the level of support enjoyed by
the union. It could certainly attract hundreds in some places, but much depended
on the degree of unrest in a particular regiment or locality and the attitude of
local commanders. It is equally impossible to say anything about the social
background or political orientation of members. Most oﬃcers of all backgrounds
would have sympathized with the union’s main objectives, but active members
tended to be of a conservative mindset, although not necessarily a reactionary
one. Ultimately, as the union admitted, most oﬃcers remained apathetic or
‘mistaken’ (non-members or prepared passively to accept events) and all oﬃcers’
bodies struggled to mobilize oﬃcers throughout 1917.
40 VGKO, no. 3, 12 July 1917; GARF, f. 1780, op. 1, d. 71, ll. 57–57ob.
41 VGKO, no. 5, 24 Aug. 1917; GARF, f. 1780, op. 1, d. 72, ll. 5–5ob (Black Sea) ; d. 73, ll. 46–46ob
(Caucasus). 42 VGKO, no. 4, 25 July 1917.
43 VGKO, no. 1, 14 June 1917; no. 2, 22 June 1917 ; no. 3, 12 July 1917.
44 GARF, f. 1780, op. 1, d. 72, l. 7.
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The information available on the union’s leadership – the thirty-two-man
main committee – is also incomplete.45 Members ranged from the lowest rank
(ensign) to colonels, but lieutenant-colonels (eleven members) and captains (also
eleven) dominated. There were only four ensigns. The average age where avail-
able (from sixteen members) was thirty-four. Although Novosil’tsev (forty-ﬁve)
was older, his deputies, Pronin and Sidorin (both thirty-ﬁve), were not. The army
predominated, although a few probably represented the ﬂeet. Of the eleven with
known social backgrounds, seven were from the nobility, two from the peasantry,
and one each from clergy and merchant backgrounds. At least seven had gradu-
ated from the elite general staﬀ academy.
The backgrounds of Novosil’tsev, Pronin, and Sidorin, along with a few other
prominent ﬁgures, support the view of Wildman, cited above, that the union
represented a narrow segment of the oﬃcer corps. However, other information
and the anonymity of many members, suggest that a signiﬁcant number came
from less traditional (and harder to trace) backgrounds. Ensign A. V. Ivanov
helped organize the union’s founding congress and served as one of its secretaries.
He had been imprisoned for socialist agitation alongside the Menshevik, I. G.
Tsereteli, prior to the war, but now supported a non-political, professional union
for oﬃcers. Lieutenant-Colonel I. G. Soots was an Estonian who advocated
greater independence for national minorities within the Russian empire against
the wishes of many oﬃcers.46 The union, therefore, recruited across the oﬃcers
corps. Active members were representative of the mass of oﬃcers, originating
from diverse social and political backgrounds (although those with Ivanov’s
history were more likely to join the socialist oﬃcers’ union). Prominent members,
though, were from traditional backgrounds and they left a more visible mark on
the surviving evidence.
V
Divisions in the main committee are most evident when examining growing
political ambitions within the union. Despite his speech to the congress de-
nouncing political objectives, Novosil’tsev described how on 23 May, a day after
the congress ﬁnished, Pronin told him that a military dictatorship was the only
way to save the army (and, by implication, the country) from destruction.
Novosil’tsev agreed to act in that direction, but argued that only a few committee
members should be involved initially to maintain secrecy. The two co-opted
Sidorin, Rozhenko, and Kravchenko.47 They aimed to cultivate greater links
between oﬃcers and other groups in order to gather support for political change.
Some of these links were open. The union publicly hoped to beneﬁt from patri-
otism arising from the war to bolster its ﬁnances and to foster greater political
inﬂuence, looking at industrialists and Kadets respectively. Connections already
45 GARF, f. 1780, op. 1, d. 71, l. 34. 46 Delo Kornilova, II, pp. 125–6, 322–3.
47 GARF, f. 6422, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 155ob, 159.
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existed from before 1917, but these needed to be extended and strengthened,
whilst Pronin and Novosil’tsev were now also keen to gauge the political mood
among other groups.
Industrialists had numerous organizations, long-running newspapers, sizeable
ﬁnances, and signiﬁcant inﬂuence, as prominent members held government posts
after February. There were divisions, particularly between industrialists in
Petrograd and Moscow, but by summer 1917, they all agreed on the need for
‘ strong government ’. They were also seeking alliances with other like-minded
groups and funded various military groups to aid the war eﬀort. In May, the
political section of the Union of Trade and Industry heard a report on the new
Union of Oﬃcers from a representative, before providing 25,000 rubles for it to
establish a newspaper and organize propaganda.48 This was a massive boost.
Some oﬃcers were suspicious of ‘capitalists ’, but as one branch noted, all
organizations needed money and there was nothing illegal or reprehensible in
accepting it from capitalists.49 Industrialists also formed the Republican Centre in
May, which promoted the war eﬀort, attacked socialists (especially Bolsheviks),
and pressed for law and order.50 Publicly, it supported a republic for Russia, but
many members favoured an authoritarian government or dictatorship.51
Novosil’tsev and Pronin were members of the centre’s military section, which
sought to unite the numerous patriotic groups that existed across the military.
The only potential political target was the liberal Kadet party. In the new
revolutionary politics, conservative parties had disappeared; liberals were the
new ‘conservatives ’ with socialists as the only alternatives. Furthermore,
Novosil’tsev had represented the Kadets in the last Duma, albeit on its con-
servative wing. Novosil’tsev, Sidorin, and Kravchenko started visiting Kadets in
Moscow and Petrograd from early June, reporting on the situation in the military,
whilst judging their opinions on events. The oﬃcers, though, were unimpressed,
feeling that the Kadets did not fully understand the extent of the disintegration of
the military and were even favouring the plans for an oﬀensive. The Kadets
seemed disillusioned with the government, but unwilling to talk in detail about
alternatives.52 They were cautious about supporting groups, such as the union,
that were seen as ‘counter-revolutionary ’.
Novosil’tsev and the others took time to agree on a possible ﬁgurehead for a
military dictatorship. Alekseev was the ﬁrst choice, but some oﬃcers believed that
he should have provided greater resistance to the revolutionary reforms to the
military. The focus shifted to Vice-Admiral A. V. Kolchak, commander of the
Black Sea ﬂeet, whose determination had preserved order there until early June.
Kolchak expressed his willingness to participate in ‘ illegal activities ’ in talks with
48 V. Laverychev, Po tu storonu barrikad (Moscow, 1967), p. 194.
49 GARF, f. 1780, op. 1, d. 72, l. 51.
50 RPG, III, pp. 1534–5; GARF, f. 1780, op. 1, d. 77, ll. 121–122ob.
51 F. Vinberg, V plenu u ‘obez’ian ’ (zapiski ‘kontr-revoliutsionera ’) (Kiev, 1918), pp. 98–9.
52 GARF, f. 6422, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 159ob–163ob.
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Novosil’tsev as long as there were ‘ serious plans ’, and he was brieﬂy involved in
the Republican Centre.53 He was, though, too reactionary for liberals, whilst
the government saw him as a threat and dispatched him on a mission to America
in late July. Instead, General L. G. Kornilov’s outspoken defence of oﬃcers,
together with his success during the failed oﬀensive in June, saw him gain un-
disputed support. His appointment as commander-in-chief on 18 July was widely
supported by conservatives and galvanized elites. He immediately met the main
committee of the union, expressing his support for their activities. Novosil’tsev,
Sidorin, and Pronin remained behind for a private meeting. They argued that a
military dictatorship was the only solution to the chaos. Kornilov did not rule
it out, although he rejected a return to Tsarism. He declared that he would act
if necessary, but he was still conﬁdent that he could enact positive change in co-
operation with the existing government.54
By early August, the union was operating on diﬀerent levels. The majority of
the main committee was busy defending the professional interests of oﬃcers,
publishing materials, and agitating for support. Open links were forged with other
elite and conservative groups based on practical and ﬁnancial co-operation.
However, a small group was using these connections to discuss political alter-
natives to the Provisional Government, especially a dictatorship dominated by the
military. Soviet historians usually incriminated a large section of the main com-
mittee, if not all of them, in this ‘conspiracy’.55 Evidence suggests that no more
than several were active. Other committee members later vehemently denied
knowledge of any ‘plot ’ and their accounts have a ring of truth. The background
of some, for example Ivanov and Soots mentioned above, makes them unlikely to
favour anything that would threaten the achievements of February. The Estonian,
Soots, denied that he would have jeopardised the revolution and the freedoms
gained by national minorities, although he admitted that he may have been ex-
cluded from political discussions because of these views. These ﬁgures and others
stressed that they were only active in defending the professional interests of oﬃ-
cers.56 They were aware that Novosil’tsev and others travelled to Moscow and
Petrograd to obtain ﬁnancial support ; beyond that, they were occupied with their
own duties in the union and unaware of plans for political change.
V I
There is no doubt that the union’s increasingly assertive voice and growing
presence, combined with the new government policies, escalated tensions and
53 GARF, f. 6422, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 155ob, 165.
54 GARF, f. 6422, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 180ob–181ob.
55 Ioﬀe argued that the ‘authoritarian’ group were in the majority, whilst a small group favoured
compromise to maintain stability and were loyal to the government ; G. Ioﬀe, Semnadtsatyi god (Moscow,
1995), pp. 74–5.
56 Delo Kornilova, II, pp. 125–6, 322–3. See also a later account, S. Riasnianskii, ‘Vospominaniia o
soiuze oﬁtserov i Bykhove’, Vestnik pervopokhodnika, 79–81 (1968), pp. 64–9.
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fostered popular suspicions. Soldiers saw no need for unions of oﬃcers. As one
soldiers’ soviet noted, if oﬃcers were loyal, they were welcome to participate in
soldiers’ bodies. Some soldiers quickly highlighted the political threat of permit-
ting any kind of representation for oﬃcers.57 Others responded to particular as-
pects of the union’s programme, arguing that the removal of politics from the
military, for example, would deprive millions of the right to democracy. The
restoration of the ‘counter-revolutionary ’ death penalty fuelled distrust and, on 11
August, Kaluga garrison stated that members of oﬃcers’ unions ‘should be con-
sidered a traitor to the revolution’.58 Occasionally, suspicions turned violent with
protests and beatings aﬀecting those promoting the union. Captain S. N.
Riasnianskii, a member of the main committee, admitted that he and others were
even threatened with death. More frequently, the troops’ mistrust made it diﬃcult
for oﬃcers to meet and organize, with numerous assemblies disrupted or dis-
persed.59
On 4 August, Izvestiia, published by the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’
Deputies in Petrograd, launched a stinging attack on Kornilov (as did other
newspapers at this time) calling for his dismissal. On 7 August, the union publicly
described these as ‘shameful ’ comments and urged support for Kornilov as the
last chance of a bright future for Russia. On 10 August, various groups, including
the union, issued a joint declaration along the same lines.60 The union received
dozens of supportive telegrams from across the military, mostly its own branches,
but also from ‘assemblies ’ of oﬃcers. They all echoed the call to support
Kornilov. The measures that he was proposing – restoring discipline, limiting
the inﬂuence of committees, and removing the interference of committees in
military matters, for example – had their complete agreement. His removal was
unthinkable. As one branch of the union noted, ‘General Kornilov has given us
the conﬁdence that the army may yet be saved and with it Russia. His energetic
activities have already yielded results and the army is now on the path to
revival. ’61
However, Kornilov and the union should have been careful not to read too
much more into these declarations of support. If some were aggressive, riling
against the inﬂuence of German money and socialists in general,62 others re-
emphasized that oﬃcers, including union members, were only united on what
needed to be done to improve the situation within the military and remained
divided politically. Addressing rumours of ‘counter-revolution’, several speciﬁ-
cally stressed that they would only happily carry out ‘ legal orders ’.63 Most oﬃcers
did not see the need for strong measures, or even the importance of Kornilov in
delivering these measures, as incompatible with the current government. Several
57 Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v voennykh okrugakh. Mart 1917g.-mart 1918g. (Moscow, 1988), pp. 83, 105, 135.
58 Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Russkoi armii, p. 570; Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v voennykh, pp. 210–11.
59 Riasnianskii, ‘Vospominaniia ’, p. 64; K. Oberuchev, Oﬁtsery v Russkoi revoliutsii (New York, NY,
1918), pp. 39–43. 60 GARF, f. 1780, op. 1, d. 74, ll. 58–61.
61 GARF, f. 1780, op. 1, d. 74, ll. 22–22ob. Similar messages were forwarded to Kornilov (l. 3).
62 GARF, f. 1780, op. 1, d. 74, ll. 7, 21. 63 GARF, f. 1780, op. 1, d. 74, ll. 4, 13ob, 63–5.
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messages ﬁnished by expressing their support for the government, whilst still
castigating it for not acting decisively against the attacks on Kornilov.64 There was
little sense of active support for further political change.
Uncertainty also characterized the ﬁrst public meeting of conservative and
liberal groups, the ﬁrst Congress of Public Figures in Moscow on 8–10 August
1917. Almost 400 attended, including politicians, senior oﬃcers, industrialists,
landowners, clergy, and oﬃcers’ bodies. The congress discussed a range of issues
and expressed its support for Kornilov on 9 August. It elected a permanent
council (which included Novosil’tsev) to monitor important developments.65
Rozhenko and Novosil’tsev outlined their plans for political change at several
private meetings. According to one witness, the oﬃcers expected the imminent
removal of Kornilov. If this happened, they proposed rallying around him,
overthrowing the government, and establishing a dictatorship to suppress the
Petrograd soviet. They needed the support of ‘ state ’ ﬁgures to create a new
government. The intentions behind the plan were met favourably – ‘ the bright
star of Kornilov burned like a meteor in the night sky ’ with the promise of greater
authority and order. The practical aspects, however, were ‘unexpectedly naı¨ve
and rash ’. The ‘adventure ’ was poorly planned and success was assumed. P. N.
Miliukov, leader of the Kadets, voiced the general view when he praised the
patriotism of the oﬃcers, but declared that the Kadets could not provide active
support, as the plans were unlikely to gain popular support.66
A report, purportedly delivered to one of these meetings, provided more
detail.67 Anarchy and the precedence of class interests over state concerns proved
that Russians were unprepared for democracy. Therefore, the Constituent
Assembly should be abandoned temporarily. Russians voted for ‘demagogic ’
parties without understanding their policies and proportional representation
provided inﬂuence to marginal parties. Instead, a military dictator was needed
to regain authority. His activities would be controlled and focused towards
establishing ‘elementary order ’ (securing the safety of the individual and of
property through law and the courts), conducting educational and cultural work,
introducing social reforms to improve the lives of workers, and achieving greater
equality in landownership and payment of taxes. A national assembly would
be created once order was re-established with a constitutional monarchy as a
64 GARF, f. 1780, op. 1, d. 74, ll. 28–30.
65 Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii v avguste 1917g. (Moscow, 1959), pp. 360–2. Also V. Polikarpov,
Voennaia kontrrevoliutsiia v Rossii, 1905–1917 (Moscow, 1990), pp. 233–8.
66 N. Savich, Vospominaniia (St Petersburg, 1993), pp. 246–50. Similar views are in RPG, III, p. 1542.
The Kadets were split ; few were actively involved, but many would have supported Kornilov if he had
succeeded (N. Dumova, Kadetskaia partiia v period pervoi mirovoi voiny i fevral’skoi revoliutsii (Moscow, 1988),
pp. 189–91; W. Rosenberg, Liberals in the Russian Revolution (Princeton, NJ, 1974), pp. 222–8). V. A.
Maklakov accused Miliukov of encouraging the union by not rejecting their plans outright; Katkov,
Kornilov revolt, pp. 142–3.
67 GARF, f. 3529 [Gosudarstvennoe soveshchanie 1917g.], op. 1, d. 31, ll. 1–5. The evidence that it
was delivered at this congress comes from details added by an archivist, but it seems representative of
oﬃcers’ views.
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possible future compromise to guarantee law, order, and social reform. If this was
the report delivered, the arguments stressing the temporary and beneﬁcial nature
of the proposed dictatorship would help explain the sympathy of liberals and
others who had supported the democratic ideals of February.
The government’s attempt to reconcile diﬀerences and foster support started a
few days later at the Moscow State Conference (12–15 August). The conference
vividly displayed the divisions. The ‘right ’ stood on one side considering pro-
posals to replace the government with a dictatorship. The ‘ left ’ stood on the other
side, mostly calling for the transfer of power to the soviet. In the middle, Kerenskii
inevitably failed to bring the two together. Oﬃcially, the union had two re-
presentatives,68 but members were present in the staﬀs of armies and military
regions, military schools, Cossacks, and, in Novosil’tsev’s case, as a Duma deputy.
Their numbers were small in comparison with the 2,400–600 individuals
who attended, but they were vocal, especially when in tandem with landowners,
industrialists, and other elites. Senior generals, including Alekseev, one of the
union’s oﬃcial representatives, reiterated the usual demands,69 but divisions
among oﬃcers continued. Representatives of the Soviet of Oﬃcers’ Deputies,
although now arguing for greater discipline and authority for oﬃcers, directly
refuted a dictatorship, believing that it would destroy the army and the country.
Instead, legal order and cultural enlightenment would revive discipline.
Novosil’tsev found it ‘ strange ’ to be talking about educating not ﬁghting,70 but
clearly some oﬃcers remained committed to the revolution.
The weeks after the Moscow Conference saw tensions escalate between
Kornilov and the government, culminating in the infamous ‘Kornilov revolt ’
from 27 to 31 August, one of the central events of 1917. Kornilov was determined
to deal with the corrosive inﬂuence, as he saw it, of the Soviet of Workers’ and
Soldiers’ Deputies in Petrograd. The question was whether this would be done
with government support or without it. Fears of a rumoured Bolshevik coup,
together with misplaced conﬁdence about his level of support, led to a growing
assertiveness on his part. Kerenskii was also keen to limit the soviet, but he
wanted to restrict its authority, rather than eradicate it. Sympathetic to pleas for a
strong government, he was nevertheless determined to remain in power. Kornilov
started moving troops into position, but a compromise appeared possible up to
the last minute. Events ﬁnally exploded on 27 August. A garbled conversation
with Kornilov fuelled Kerenskii’s fears that Kornilov intended to replace him.
He dismissed Kornilov as commander-in-chief. Kornilov refused to depart,
denounced his ‘betrayal ’ by the government, and loyal troops under General
A. M. Krymov moved towards Petrograd. Soldiers and workers mobilized,
hindering Krymov’s advance and quickly convinced his troops that they were
being used as part of a counter-revolutionary coup rather than acting to save the
68 GARF, f. 3529, op. 1, d. 7, l. 21.
69 GARF, f. 3529, op. 1, d. 4, ll. 27–40, 62–9; RPG, III, pp. 1474–80.
70 GARF, f. 3529, op. 1, d. 4, ll. 40–1 ; GARF, f. 6422, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 193ob–194.
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government as they had been told. By 31 August, Krymov had committed suicide,
the revolt had disintegrated, and Kornilov and a number of his closest associates
were arrested.71
The union’s role in these events was mixed. Pronin, Sidorin, and, to a lesser
extent, Novosil’tsev (along with oﬃcers in other organizations), were more de-
termined supporters of a dictatorship than Kornilov himself, who was prepared to
compromise with the government if his demands were met. Miliukov, who had
meetings with both the oﬃcers and Kornilov, felt that the oﬃcers were even
driving the conspiracy.72 Nevertheless, events took Novosil’tsev and others by
surprise. In talks with the government on 23 August, Kornilov had ﬁnally agreed
to demands that the union’s ‘harmful ’ activities should be transferred from
Stavka to Moscow. Novosil’tsev was in Moscow ﬁnding premises when the revolt
broke out. He felt that they were ‘not ready ’ ; ‘public ﬁgures ’ would not commit
and existing preparations would be ruined. He returned on 28 August, but could
only join others in writing appeals.73
On 28 August, the union printed 10,000 copies of an appeal declaring that
oﬃcers needed to unite to save Kornilov from a Bolshevik-inﬂuenced govern-
ment, and the military from internal and external enemies. Power needed to be
strong prior to the Constituent Assembly.74 This appeal seemed to demonstrate
conclusively that the entire main committee of the union was involved in the
revolt. Unsurprisingly, its members argued otherwise when interrogated in early
September. They denied participating in a plot and argued that they had little
choice but to support Kornilov. Rumours started circulating on 27 August that
Kornilov had been dismissed. When the available members of the committee
met in the morning of 28 August (accounts vary, but probably no more than a
dozen), they were ‘completely bewildered’. The government had previously
supported Kornilov, but had now apparently dismissed him. There was no
replacement, whilst Kornilov’s appeals sounded sincere. They decided to sup-
port Kornilov. The appeal came later from Pronin who, along with Rozhenko,
was a close conﬁdant of Kornilov and had the greatest involvement in events in
Stavka (Sidorin was entrusted to mobilize oﬃcers in Petrograd, although he
proved ineﬀective). Pronin gave the ﬁrst draft of the appeal to Rozhenko, who
thought that someone else close to Kornilov had written it. Rozhenko presented
it to a second meeting of the committee in the afternoon, which approved it
unanimously after making several alterations. Novosil’tsev then signed it. None
saw it as a ‘counter-revolutionary ’ appeal. Indeed, Colonel L. I. Sazonov, a
legal expert at Stavka who was on the union’s judicial committee, only attended
the afternoon meeting, but was certain that there was nothing criminal about
the text as they were not calling for an overthrow of the government, merely
71 Munck, Kornilov revolt, pp. 40–123.
72 P. Miliukov, The Russian Revolution (3 vols., Gulf Breeze, 1978–87), II, pp. 137–43.
73 GARF, f. 6422, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 202–4. 74 GARF, f. 1780, op. 1, d. 44, l. 50.
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supporting Kornilov in the absence of a clear successor or plan for the mili-
tary.75
All oﬃcers comment on the confusing and chaotic nature of events, and the
fact that Kornilov could not eﬀectively mobilize his most loyal supporters meant
that the revolt was doomed to fail from the beginning. For every oﬃcer that
responded favourably to the revolt, several did not and hundreds kept their heads
down, irrespective of what they thought. Several generals, such as Lukomskii and
Denikin, openly supported Kornilov, but could oﬀer little practical help. Many
were simply confused; General B. V. Gerua recalled how a telegram from
Kerenskii calling Kornilov a traitor arrived at the same time as one from
Kornilov alleging that Kerenskii was a ‘German traitor ’.76 Wildman noted that
the revolt demonstrated the weakness of oﬃcers and that ‘hard-core support ’ for
Kornilov was ‘exceedingly slight ’.77 Ultimately, there was confusion over his
aims. Soviet historians talk of his ‘programme’ and its ‘exceptionally reactionary ’
character. By ‘programme’, they mean his appeals and the gossip of associates
conﬂated with their own assumptions.78 There was no programme of speciﬁc
policies. During the revolt, Kornilov issued vague patriotic appeals designed to
foster support across society. He gave primacy to the Constituent Assembly and,
on 28 August, invited ministers to form a government of people’s defence with
him,79 but it was too vague to convince elites that he could succeed.
V I I
Thirty oﬃcers were arrested for participating in Kornilov’s revolt and im-
prisoned, including Generals Kornilov, Lukomskii, and Denikin, and thirteen
committee members of the union, including Novosil’tsev and Pronin. Further
investigations tried to identify others ; commissars asked for lists of oﬃcers who
were in Stavka from 26 August onwards and explanations of their activities. The
personnel at Stavka were changed and oﬃcers were not to contact former staﬀ or
fulﬁl previous orders.80 Unoﬃcial arrests of oﬃcers by committees and soldiers
returned to the high levels seen after the February Revolution. The government
argued that punishment had to be conducted legally,81 but soldiers wanted im-
mediate action. Many demanded the liquidation of the union as a ‘nest of
counter-revolutionaries ’ as well as, to a lesser extent, other oﬃcers’ bodies. Some
argued that Kornilov and his conspirators, as traitors, were prime candidates for
75 This account comes from the testimonies of eight committee members; Delo Kornilova, II,
pp. 29–31, 125–7, 275–83, 296–8, 313–24. Pronin and Rozhenko were involved in agitating among
oﬃcers and sending supporters to Siderin in Petrograd to support Krymov, but few were recruited.
76 B. Gerua, Vospominaniia o moei zhizni (2 vols., Paris, 1969–70), II, pp. 212–13.
77 Wildman, ‘Oﬃcers of the General Staﬀ’, p. 98.
78 For example, Ivanov, Kontrrevoliutsiia, pp. 84–96.
79 GARF, f. 1780, op. 1, d. 53, ll. 23–4.
80 GARF, f. 1780, op. 1, d. 62, ll. 19, 39; d. 44, ll. 109–10, 112–112ob, 117–23.
81 Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii v sentiabre 1917g. (Moscow, 1961), pp. 222–3.
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the restored death penalty. Some desired a complete ‘cleansing’ of the command
structure. Others forced oﬃcers to sign documents declaring that they were not
and had not been members of the union, and would not take part in counter-
revolutionary activities. Several were shot in Helsinki for refusing to comply.
Oﬃcers should not be allowed to form their own organizations ; even oﬃcers’
canteens should close, according to one regiment.82 The Union of Oﬃcers was
not actually banned by the government, despite the pressure. Nevertheless, with
its members forced to keep their heads down, it ceased to be an active body.
Numerous oﬃcers distanced themselves from it, whilst some branches dis-
associated themselves from Kornilov. The commander of Moscow military re-
gion, General A. I. Verkhovskii, ordered a search of the Moscow branch in the
immediate aftermath of the revolt and closed it completely a couple of days
later.83
Alekseev attempted to protect oﬃcers during his short-lived period as chief of
staﬀ after the revolt. After his dismissal, he wrote a letter to Miliukov on 12
September demanding that he help prevent the thirty imprisoned oﬃcers from
standing trial. Alekseev also requested Miliukov to ask industrialists to contribute
300,000 rubles to help support the families of those arrested. After all, they had
been heavily involved in the pre-Kornilov meetings and Alekseev threatened to
make this public.84 Oﬃcers, though, were back at square one: the military had
deteriorated further, their position was worse than ever, and they had less chance
to make their voice heard. The deep gulf between oﬃcers and soldiers, as General
I. P. Sytin noted on 10 September, was now a chasm.85 Furthermore, the
government was now weaker than before and unable to implement any orders to
safeguard the position and interests of oﬃcers.
In the Second Army, the commissar, K. Grodskii, distributed two telegrams on
9–10 September designed to rehabilitate oﬃcers. He expressed conﬁdence in
oﬃcers, arguing that the majority believed in the government and that only a
small number of staﬀ oﬃcers supported Kornilov. He believed that most oﬃcers
had joined the union as a professional union and had nothing to do with the
political activities of its leaders in Stavka. The union was a means of protecting
oﬃcers from the politics that had invaded the military after February. He wanted
assemblies of oﬃcers to express their opinions of the union, which would, he
hoped, stop a few individuals placing the whole organization under suspicion.86
Grodskii was providing oﬃcers with a loophole to disavow Kornilov, the revolt,
and the union. Nonetheless, by the time replies started returning a fortnight later,
82 See Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v voennykh, pp. 233–4; Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii v sentiabre, pp. 394–8,
408, 410, 417; and Baltiiskie moriaki v podgotovke i provedenii velikoi oktiabr’skoi sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsii
(Moscow, 1957), pp. 216–17, 252–3. On Helsinki ; ‘Baltiiskii ﬂot nakanune oktiabria (iz dnevnika I. I.
Rengartena) ’, Krasnyi arkhiv, 35 (1929), pp. 18–19. Similar demands were made by workers and peasants
across Russia; GARF, f. 1778 [Kantseliariia ministra-predsedatelia vremennogo pravitel’stva. 1917],
op. 1, d. 238. 83 Rech’, no. 205, 1 Sept. 1917; no. 207, 3 Sept. 1917.
84 RPG, III, pp. 1604–6. 85 Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Russkoi armii, pp. 406–7.
86 GARF, f. 1780, op. 1, d. 62, ll. 75–6, 91–91ob.
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the immediate backlash from the revolt had died down and oﬃcers clearly felt
able to express frank opinions. Some assemblies did assert that they had refused to
join the union earlier, suspicious of its political activities, the leadership’s auth-
oritarian stance, and its divisive impact.87 Some merely noted that they had
considered the union to be a purely professional organization.88 The majority,
though, were resolute in their continued support for the original published
objectives of the union – improving the ﬁghting capabilities of the military, pro-
moting patriotism and supporting oﬃcers. The main committee, they argued, in
becoming involved in politics, had followed a path against the wishes of many
members, who should not be held responsible. Furthermore, several argued that
they, as members of a professional group (oﬃcers), continued to support the need
for a union to represent their interests within a ‘democratic ’ Russia. Disbanding
the union would only strengthen and justify the misguided suspicions of the
backward soldiers.89 Grodskii certainly expected greater condemnation of the
union. He forwarded one reply to the commander-in-chief and minister of war on
4 October in which oﬃcers condemned the misguided and ineﬀectual nature of
the union, declared that they were disbanding their branch, and called for the
prosecution of its leadership.90 There is no evidence that he passed on the other
messages.
Nevertheless, Novosil’tsev noted that the union was in limbo after the revolt
with many local branches inactive or closed. A few individual members (for
example, Sidorin) were involved in plans for an armed uprising in October, but
Novosil’tsev was unsure what to do after his release on 22 October.91 Technically,
the union continued until January 1918. Novosil’tsev and at least twelve other
committee members ﬂed south after the October Revolution and joined
Alekseev’s volunteer army to ﬁght the Bolsheviks. Novosil’tsev felt that there was
no need for the union in the new army, which prioritized the authority of oﬃcers
and strict discipline. Others disagreed and it was not until 1918 that they were
convinced otherwise.92
V I I I
Overall, the Union of Oﬃcers was not particularly successful. This was hardly
surprising given its struggle for support, the intense suspicion of soldiers and
sailors, and the growing radicalism of the population. Nevertheless, although the
union’s leaders and members were aware of this, sizeable numbers still felt it
87 GARF, f. 1780, op. 1, d. 62, ll. 96–96ob, 99, 121, 127, 138–138ob.
88 GARF, f. 1780, op. 1, d. 62, ll. 107, 113, 118, 122.
89 GARF, f. 1780, op. 1, d. 62, ll. 97–97ob, 100–102ob, 109, 123, 125–125ob, 128, 131, 133–135ob.
90 N. Kakurin, ed., Razlozhenie armii v 1917 godu (Moscow, 1925), pp. 114–15.
91 GARF, f. 6422, op. 1, d. 1, l. 223. On Sidorin, GARF, f. R-336 [Sledstvennaia komissiia
revoliutsionnogo tribunala], op. 1, d. 277, l. 95ob. Later investigations by the Bolsheviks failed to
highlight union activity after Kornilov, d. 34a, ll. 30–46ob.
92 GARF, f. 6422, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 226–27ob, 235–235ob.
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essential that oﬃcers had their own union. This would not be a union re-
presenting certain political viewpoints, such as the Union of Oﬃcer-Republicans,
or a union closely linked with other political bodies and social groups, such as the
Soviet of Oﬃcers’ Deputies, but a professional union representing the everyday
interests and concerns of oﬃcers. Despite their minority position, these oﬃcers
believed that such a union could serve to unite oﬃcers dispersed across the front,
articulate their views, and take a valuable part in the ﬂawed democracy of 1917,
especially alongside organizations representing other elite groups. Clearly not
even the majority of oﬃcers were members, but the union established a sizeable
presence across the military, especially among middle-ranking and senior oﬃcers.
This provided it with disproportionate inﬂuence in Stavka, making it one of the
most vocal groups calling for ﬁrmer measures in the military and the country.
Ultimately, there was no such thing as a purely ‘professional ’ organization in
1917. As the revolution progressed, social and political tensions grew, and the
‘professional ’ demands of various groups became inextricably linked to political
goals. Increasingly, in the case of the Union of Oﬃcers, demands for stronger
policies led to talk of a stronger government to defend their interests. This placed
oﬃcers at odds with the popular mood, encouraging popular suspicions of
the union to increase alongside demands for its closure. It also highlighted that
oﬃcers only agreed about problems, not solutions. The union was popularly seen
as ‘counter-revolutionary’, but most of its members were not against the
February Revolution or the Provisional Government, but the disintegration of the
military and the growing social unrest. Certainly, a group within the union’s
leadership took this discontent to its extreme, exemplifying the military’s distrust
of civilian politicians by demanding a military dictatorship. Most oﬃcers, though,
recognized that this was not likely to succeed, and would intensify conﬂict and
further worsen the position of oﬃcers. Many did not even desire it. Instead,
oﬃcers constantly argued about how best to restore order in the military, even
within the Union of Oﬃcers, helping to explain the catastrophic failure of
Kornilov’s revolt. Yet, even amidst its repercussions in September, oﬃcers still
believed that they needed representation.
More broadly, the gathering activity of elite groups like oﬃcers, culminating in
Kornilov’s revolt, helped foster fears of counter-revolution, shift the popular
mood to the left, and exacerbate social unrest. In response, conservative elites
could only demand authoritarian measures from the government and, increas-
ingly, consider a change of government. This dynamic lay at the heart of the
revolutionary process, signalling the failure of the Provisional Government and
the democratic experiment in 1917, whilst laying the foundations for the Bolshevik
revolution and civil war.
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